My jurisdiction is: Pennsylvania
How can local agent (code enforcement) bring forth a action in the name
and authority of the "we the people of the Commonwealth". This is Non-traffic offense a/k/a summary offense. When case law says otherwise See:Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Lawrence County.
Commonwealth v. Fontana
But where the proceedings in the lower court not of record are void ab initio, as in the instant case, no useful purpose could be served by certifying the case to the court of quarter sessions for a hearing de novo on appeal. The proceedings in the present case were prosecuted in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This was contrary to the mandate of Pleasant Hills Borough v. Carroll, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 102, 125 A. 2d 466 (1956), which held that suits for violation of borough ordinances should be brought in the name of the borough. See also Commonwealth v. Collum, 32 Lehigh 14 (1966). The recently enacted borough code did not change this requirement of the law: The Borough Code of February 1, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1656, 53 PS § 48301, et seq. The intent of the legislature that suits to enforce municipal ordinances shall be initiated in the name of the municipality is specifically spelled out in the Second Class Township Code, Act of June 19, 1961, P. L. 486, as amended, 53 PS § 65741; in the First Class Township Code, Act of June 24, 1931, P. L. 1206, et seq., 53 PS § 56502, 53 PS § 58301, et seq., and also in the Third Class City Code, Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 932, et seq., 53 PS § 36017.
How can local agent (code enforcement) bring forth a action in the name
and authority of the "we the people of the Commonwealth". This is Non-traffic offense a/k/a summary offense. When case law says otherwise See:Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Lawrence County.
Commonwealth v. Fontana
But where the proceedings in the lower court not of record are void ab initio, as in the instant case, no useful purpose could be served by certifying the case to the court of quarter sessions for a hearing de novo on appeal. The proceedings in the present case were prosecuted in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This was contrary to the mandate of Pleasant Hills Borough v. Carroll, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 102, 125 A. 2d 466 (1956), which held that suits for violation of borough ordinances should be brought in the name of the borough. See also Commonwealth v. Collum, 32 Lehigh 14 (1966). The recently enacted borough code did not change this requirement of the law: The Borough Code of February 1, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1656, 53 PS § 48301, et seq. The intent of the legislature that suits to enforce municipal ordinances shall be initiated in the name of the municipality is specifically spelled out in the Second Class Township Code, Act of June 19, 1961, P. L. 486, as amended, 53 PS § 65741; in the First Class Township Code, Act of June 24, 1931, P. L. 1206, et seq., 53 PS § 56502, 53 PS § 58301, et seq., and also in the Third Class City Code, Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 932, et seq., 53 PS § 36017.
