The initial stop was only legal up and until the officer realized his "error" when reading my plate. Even if he had me on tape hitting the fog line, that is still not enough for a legal stop there are loads of cases to support this out there and I could have proved it at my evidentiary hearing. There must be more to indicate I was a harm to myself or others on the road, there are loads of cases to support this on the internet.
The extended excessive detainment of me in the seizing of my DL by the cop AT THE POINT IN WHICH HE REALIZED IS ERROR, BEFORE HE EXITED HIS OWN VEHICLE was not legal.
There are conditions under which ID related evidence is suppressible as well, so here you go. Some of these are state cases, some are federal. Hopefully this will help someone.
Since Officer Toth harbored no suspicion of wrong-doing within the totality of the circumstances to justify further investigation by the time he had pulled the Appellants over on the highway, we conclude that there existed no legal reason for him to conduct the stop and question the Appellants about the ownership of the car or their reasons for being on the road that night. Therefore, we hold that all evidence gathered as a result of the stop must be suppressed. Because we remand on the basis that the investigative stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we do not address the other issues raised by the Appellants.
Further, in Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that, absent articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
The courts have regularly recognized that law enforcement officers almost
invariably effect a Fourth Amendment seizure of a citizen when they hold a driver's
license, an identification card, a vehicle registration, or similarly important papers
belonging to the individual. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d at 1309 n.8 (collecting cases);
United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2005); Pollman, 286 Kan. at
889 (An officer's retention of a person's driver's license, absent some "offsetting
circumstances," probably effects a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.).
For example, federal agents seized an individual when they accosted him in an airport
parking lot, asked for and retained his driver's license, and then interrogated him about
his activities. Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1068 ("[W]hat began as a consensual encounter
quickly became an investigatory detention once the agents received Mr. Lambert's
driver's license and did not return it to him."). Simply put, a reasonable person would not
feel free to break off an encounter with a police officer and, in doing so, leave behind
vital personal documents. Indeed, that reasonable person likely would have a difficult
time going about his or her business without a driver's license or other identification. 46
F.3d at 1068. See also United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 2006) (A
police officer effects a seizure of an individual by retaining his or her driver's license for
5 minutes to run a warrant check.); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 427 (Tenn. 2000) (In
finding police seized a young man outside a convenience store when they took his
identification, the court states: "Abandoning one's identification is simply not a practical
or realistic option for a reasonable person in modern society.") (cases cited).
US v. Edgerton, 438 F. 3d 1043
The detention of a driver, however brief, during the course of a routine traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir.2005). The standards by which we measure the legality of such stop and resulting detention under the Fourth Amendment are well established. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Where the historical facts giving rise to the stop and detention are undisputed, the only question is one of law, namely, whether the stop and detention, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, were reasonable. See United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir.2005). A traffic stop is reasonable at its inception if the detaining officer, at the very least, reasonably suspects the driver has violated the law. In United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (10th Cir.2001), we explained that while either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc). Unless the officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that illegal activity unrelated to the stop has occurred or the driver otherwise consents to the encounter, the resulting detention is reasonable only so long as the officer's subsequent conduct is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial stop. See United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir.2005). In other words, once the purpose of the stop is satisfied and any underlying reasonable suspicion dispelled, the driver's detention generally must end without undue delay. See United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720, 721-22 (10th Cir.1992).
1050 In People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo.1995), the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the legality of posting a temporary registration tag in a vehicle's rear window during nighttime hours on facts indistinguishable from the present.[8] Around 2:00 a.m., a Colorado State Trooper stopped defendant's vehicle on I-25 "because he did not see a license plate or temporary sticker on the rear of Redinger's vehicle." Id. at 82. The trooper suspected a violation of a state law requiring license plates to be "clearly visible." Id. at 82 & n. 1 (interpreting a prior version of § 42-3-202 then located at § 42-3-113). As he walked towards the vehicle, the trooper "observed a valid temporary registration plate properly displayed in the rear window on the driver's side thereof." Id. at 82. When defendant reached for his license at the trooper's behest, a bag of white powder fell from his wallet. Relying extensively on McSwain's rationale, the court suppressed the evidence. . The court held a trooper who properly initiates an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated a motor vehicle law may not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, detain and interrogate the driver after the trooper learns the initial suspicion is "ill-founded." Id. at 84.
We decline to require optimal viewing conditions before compliance with a statute requiring an otherwise unremarkable license plate to be "clearly visible" is assured. Fourth Amendment reasonableness does not depend on external conditions, but on a reasonable suspicion that a driver has violated the law. The notion that an unobscured, wholly unremarkable Colorado temporary registration tag posted in the rear window of Defendant's vehicle consistent with Colorado law was not "clearly legible" within the meaning of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-133 because "it was dark out" proves too much for us. Every temporary tag is more difficult to read in the dark when a car is traveling 70 mph on the interstate. But that does not make every vehicle displaying such a tag fair game for an extended Fourth Amendment seizure.
Once Trooper Dean was able to read the Colorado tag and deem it unremarkable, any suspicion that Defendant had violated § 8-133 dissipated because the tag was in "in a place and position to be clearly visible." At that point, McSwain instructs us for better or worse that Trooper Dean, as a matter of courtesy, should have explained to Defendant the reason for the initial stop and then allowed her to continue on her way without requiring her to produce her license and registration. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 562. Of course, we do not discount the possibility in similar circumstances that the brief encounter between an officer and driver authorized by McSwain might independently give rise to facts creating reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, thus warranting further investigation. For instance, at the commencement of his encounter with Defendant in this case, Trooper Dean noted Defendant's nervousness, an air freshener hanging from the rear console, and "energy drinks" inside the vehicle. The district court, however, made no finding in this case that the facts which Trooper Dean observed independently gave rise to reasonable suspicion and the Government makes no such argument on appeal. See United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 994 n. 5 (10th Cir.2004) (noting arguments not raised may be deemed waived). We therefore end our analysis here
The government asserts that not allowing an officer to request a driver's license and registration in this type of case will require the officer to "stop a vehicle, approach the vehicle on foot, observe it, then walk away, get in his police car, drive away and wave, leaving the stopped citizen to wonder what had just occurred." Our holding does not require such absurd conduct by police officers. As a matter of courtesy, the officer could explain to drivers in Mr. McSwain's circumstances the reason for the initial detention and then allow them to continue on their way without asking them to produce their driver's license and registration. See Ohio v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 62-63, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (1984).
State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59
Consequently, where a police officer stops a motor vehicle which displays neither front nor rear license plates, but upon approaching the stopped vehicle observes a temporary tag which is visible through the rear windshield, the driver of the vehicle may not be detained further to determine the validity of his driver's license absent some specific and articulable facts that the detention was reasonable. As a result, any evidence seized upon a subsequent search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle is inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.